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280 Abstract
Fiscal federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is characterized by multi-level 
asymmetric architecture of government sector and a high degree of fiscal decen-
tralization. Reform of indirect taxation has resulted in centralization of the major 
part of the revenues in B&H and induced a high degree of fiscal interdependence 
of governments. In the absence of national economic and fiscal goals and fiscal 
coordination required during the global economic crisis, strong autonomous acti-
vities of the Entities and District have been expressed. Uncoordinated and diver-
gent responses to the crisis in addition to distorting the achieved degree of tax 
harmonization within B&H has led to a widening fiscal deficit and the rapid 
growth of borrowing at all levels of government. The aim of this paper is to pro-
pose a new model of fiscal coordination in B&H that would mitigate the negative 
effects of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic management. The key hypo-
thesis is that, in given political constraints, only a concept of fiscal federalism that 
includes comprehensive, institutionalized and obligatory fiscal coordination can 
ensure a coherent response to the crisis. 
Keywords: intergovernmental fiscal relations, fiscal federalism, fiscal coordi-
nation
1 introduction
Expansion of the fiscal decentralization process in the world has prompted rese-
arch on the effectiveness of macroeconomic management in fiscally decentralized 
countries. Opinions of economists concerning the impact of the fiscal decentrali-
zation process on the functioning of the macroeconomic system are divided. Star-
ting from the three core functions of public finances, allocation, distribution and 
stabilization (Musgrave, 1959), Oates, creator of the theory of fiscal federalism, 
thinks that the optimum efficiency of the government sector can be ensured only 
by balancing the degree of centralization and decentralization of fiscal responsibi-
lities between the central and local governments, where a fair distribution of in-
come and economic stability can be provided by the central government, and the 
efficient use of resources by the local governments (Oates, 1972). Opponents of 
fiscal decentralization (Prud’homme, 1995) consider the excessive fiscal auto-
nomy of lower levels of government a threat to the maintenance of macroecono-
mic stability and contrary to a reasonably guided macroeconomic policy (Tanzi, 
2000). By contrast, proponents of a greater degree of fiscal decentralization be-
lieve that decentralized fiscal systems can contribute much more to macroecono-
mic policy management than is the case with centralized fiscal systems (Shah, 
1997, 2005). However, they also suggest that it is necessary to establish an appro-
priate institutional framework for macroeconomic management and to adopt cer-
tain rules that will be required for all government levels. Comparative analysis of 
the effects of the fiscal decentralization process in the world done by Ebel and 
Yilmaz (2002), Bahl (2006) and Ter-Minassen (1997) showed that a different ba-
lance of power between central and local governments can threaten the macroeco-
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281nomic stability of complex countries. Theoreticians of the new theory of fiscal 
federalism, called ‟a second generation theory”, explain poor fiscal performance 
in some countries by the deviation from the principle of allocation of responsibi-
lity for expenditures and taxes and by the weak central government (Rodden, 
2005). In conditions of strong regional governments fiscal coordination between 
governments becomes a critical issue of functioning fiscal federalism in complex 
countries. Weingast (2006) defined five conditions important for the successful 
functioning of fiscal federalism: (i) the hierarchy of government with clearly desi-
gnated scope of authority, (ii) the autonomy of sub-national governments, (iii) 
single economic space, (iv) strong budgetary rules and (v) institutionalization of 
power. They believe that the successful functioning of fiscal federalism implies a 
balance between the autonomy of sub-national governments and the authority of 
the central one where each level achieves a comparative advantage. Fiscal federa-
lism with strong budgetary rules contributes to strengthening government ac-
countability for resources entrusted and to establishing fiscal discipline. Imple-
menting fiscal authorities and rules should not be left to the discretionary deci-
sions of the central government, but it is necessary to establish an institutional 
structure that will ensure smooth functioning of fiscal federalism. In that sense 
fiscal coordination between levels of government is seen as a key tool for running 
prudent fiscal management in complex countries that can bring the fiscal policy of 
middle levels of government in line with national fiscal goals.
Achieving efficiency of macroeconomic management in a decentralized fiscal sy-
stem turned, during the global economic crisis, from being a matter of academic 
issues and case studies, into a serious problem faced by the governments of a large 
number of countries. The causes of the deterioration of fiscal positions in a num-
ber of countries can be found in the selected concept of fiscal decentralization and 
global tax reforms. The process of fiscal decentralization in the world undoubtedly 
led to an increase in the fiscal autonomy of lower levels of government. However, 
from the empirical research of Joumard and Kongsrud (2003) it can be concluded 
that the pace of delegating powers for expenditures was much faster than for ta-
xing powers as a consequence of the trend towards revenue centralization and the 
introduction of value added tax (VAT). Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006) point 
out the paradox of fiscal decentralization. Instead of increasing the fiscal auto-
nomy of lower levels of government, ignorance of the rule that “finances follow 
expenditures” in the implementation of fiscal decentralization has increased the 
dependence of lower levels of government on the central government. The global 
economic crisis from 2008 exacerbated the problem of maintaining macroecono-
mic stability in complex countries. The tendency to centralize the most productive 
taxes and to increase the discretionary jurisdiction of the central government for 
vertical transfers to lower levels of government, on the one hand, and the delega-
tion of responsibilities for expenditures to lower levels of government, especially 
those whose size and growth trends could threaten the fiscal position of the central 
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282 government, on the other hand, made lower levels of government vulnerable to 
serious budgetary shocks. 
Analyses (Blöchliger, 2010a) showed that, before the crisis, the fiscal position of 
lower levels of government was more stable than that of the central government, 
which can be explained by the existence of strong fiscal rules for lower levels 
compared to the looser rules governing the central government. However, go-
vernments of lower levels were led into deficit by the global crisis due to the 
‟scissor effect”, a sharp fall in revenues, in concert with constant or rising expen-
ditures, especially social expenditures. In most European countries the ‟scissor 
effect” has led to a real decline of local budgets, the reduction being greater for 
local than central governments (Davey, 2011). Analysis of the crisis impact on the 
budgets of the world’s governments presented by Ter-Minassian and Fedelino 
(2010) shows that the strengths of expressing the effects on budgets of lower le-
vels of government depend on, for example, the strength of the economy and 
employment in the region/local community, the structure of their own income, 
authority for expenditures that are cyclically sensitive and debt structure. Various 
manifestations of the crisis in different countries are the result of the crisis not 
having hit all governments at the same time, and of the differences in the admini-
strative capacities of governments to agree and implement fiscal policies and in-
tervention measures (Davey, 2011). Government’s response to the challenges of 
the crisis was largely determined by the degree of autonomy of the government in 
the area of revenue and expenditure, but also by possibilities of the central go-
vernment to intervene. Interventions of the central government included various 
measures: insurance of additional transfers and credits, use of accumulated finan-
cial funds (‟rainy day funds”), increase of loans or temporary relaxation of bor-
rowing rules set for lower levels of government. According to OECD research, 
governments of lower levels have acted differently. Although most central go-
vernments of members opted for expansive fiscal policy, lower levels of go-
vernment in half of the member states followed the fiscal policy of government 
while the other member states decided to cut expenses and increase revenues. The 
divergent fiscal policies in times of crisis demonstrated at different levels in the 
same country indicates the importance of the existence of intergovernmental fiscal 
coordination in order to insure a coherent government response to the economic 
crisis (Blöchliger, 2010a). Fiscal coordination between levels of government is 
seen as a key mechanism for efficient fiscal management in complex countries, 
aiming at bringing regional fiscal policies into line with national fiscal goals.
This literature review and the findings cited reveal that the negative effects of fi-
scal decentralization on the government fiscal position and the macroeconomic 
stability of a complex state are exacerbated in times of economic crisis. The im-
portance of fiscal policy for macroeconomic management is more emphasized in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina than in other complex countries, not only because of the 
highly decentralized and asymmetric fiscal structure, but also because of the 
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283 limited  possibilities of keeping an active monetary policy in terms of the existence 
of a Currency Board. 
The aim of the paper is to present a model of fiscal coordination that would enable 
the fiscal consolidation of a multi-level and highly decentralized country such as 
B&H and ensure economic recovery and macroeconomic stability. Part two of the 
paper provides insights into the evolution of the complex fiscal structure of B&H 
from the Dayton Constitution to the present, analyzing the impact of the reform of 
indirect taxes on the taxing powers of sub-national governments and intergo-
vernmental fiscal relations. The third part describes the quality of the fiscal system 
of B&H, focusing on the fiscal management and the established model of fiscal 
coordination, and analyses the levels of fiscal autonomy of the state and sub-na-
tional governments. Fiscal trends are presented in part four, and part five analyzes 
the fiscal position of B&H and its sub-national governments. The sixth part 
analyses the main drawbacks of the current loose model of fiscal coordination in 
B&H and presents an alternative model. The research should prove the hypothesis 
that only a binding, institutionalized and comprehensive fiscal coordination can 
contribute to fiscal consolidation and the economic recovery of the country.
2 fiscal arhitecture of bosnia and herzegovina
2.1 dayton competences (1996-2004)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) is a multi-level state in the political and in the 
fiscal sense. However, as compared to those in other multi-level states the political 
system in B&H has in a rather specific composition (see appendix, chart A1). It is 
composed of two entities, Federation B&H (FB&H), a highly decentralized entity 
consisting of three levels of government, the Republic of Srpska (RS), a highly 
centralized entity with two levels of government, and the District of Brčko (BD), 
which has a special status. FB&H consists of ten cantons. There are 80 municipa-
lities in the FB&H and 63 municipalities in the RS. One of the attributes of B&H 
is a weak central government at the state level. According to the Dayton Constitu-
tion the state level was assigned only limited competences for expenditures, while 
full fiscal competences were assigned to the entities. The District of Brčko, esta-
blished in 2001, had a certain level of fiscal autonomy in the field of direct and 
indirect taxation. From fiscal responsibilities under the Dayton Agreement only 
customs policy and determination of tariffs are within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the State, while the tax policy, which includes the social contributions system, is 
entirely the responsibility of the Entities in terms of legislation, administration 
and revenue allocation. Although a set of state regulations regarding the single 
customs policy was adopted in 1997, the customs administrations of the Entities 
and Brčko District continued to exist until the beginning of the reform of indirect 
taxation system. Financing of the State level of administration was conducted 
through Entity grants from the Entity budgets in the ratio 2/3 FB&H: 1/3 RS. Sub-
national governments, in FB&H the cantons, cities and municipalities, and in RS 
the cities and municipalities were funded from tax revenues collected by Entities. 
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284 The existence of autonomous customs and tax systems within B&H led to double 
internal taxation or non-taxation and a loss of public revenues. 
2.2 impact of the reform of indirect taxes on the tax structure 
The reform of indirect taxes started with an establishment of the inter-governme-
ntal Commission for Indirect Taxes under the supervision of the international 
community in the beginning of 2003. The first phase of that reform ended in De-
cember 2003 after the adoption of the Law on Indirect Taxation System in B&H 
by which the constitutional powers relating to the indirect taxation policy and the 
administration and collection of the sales tax, excises and customs duties were 
shifted from the two entities (FB&H and RS) and the District of Brčko to the state 
level. During the year 2004 the reform encompassed the final centralization of the 
customs administration and delegation of the responsibilities for indirect taxes 
(customs duties, sales tax and excises) from the Entities and District to the Indirect 
Tax Authority (ITA), the newly established State agency, and its Governing Bo-
ard, in terms of administration and tax legislation. At the end of 2004 the new 
state laws on sales tax and excise duties were adopted, replacing the legislation of 
entities and Brčko District. On 1 January 2005 the ITA and its Single Account for 
the collection of indirect taxes became fully operational. In the final stage of the 
reform of indirect taxes (2006) the state sales tax was replaced by a value added 
tax (VAT). 
After the tax jurisdiction re-composition of 2006 compared to the original juri-
sdiction of Dayton, direct taxes (income tax, profit, property, etc.) and social con-
tributions remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of Entities and District. All le-
vels of government can introduce a variety of administrative duties and nontax 
revenues. For the overview of the tax competences in B&H, see table 1.
Because of the centralization of revenues from indirect taxes, which are the domi-
nant source of revenues for all levels of government, Entities were no longer in a 
position to finance the budget of B&H. It was necessary to create a new system of 
vertical distribution of indirect taxes in B&H to ensure the adequate funding of the 
institutions of B&H, Entities and District. Furthermore, given that the local go-
vernment level had lost its own-source revenues transiting to the VAT, it was also 
necessary to establish a new system of vertical and horizontal distribution within 
Entities to ensure not only the financing of public needs in the Entities but also the 
balanced development of local communities. 
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285table 1 
Tax competences in Bosnia and Herzegovinaa
B&H BD
FB&H RS
Entity Cantons Municip. Entity Municip.
Indirect taxes
 VAT L A Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts
 Customs duties L A Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts
 Excises L A Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts
 Road fees L A Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts   Ts
Direct taxes
 Profit taxb    L A Or L A Ts   Ts    L A Or    
 Income taxc    L A Or L A    Ts   Ts L A Ts   Ts
 Property taxd    L A Or    L A Ts   Ts      Or
Social contributionse
 Health   
 insurancee    L A Or L A Or       L A Or    
 Pension  
 insurance       L A Or       L A Or    
 Unemployment 
 insurance    L A Or L A Or       L A Or    
 Children care                L A Or    
L – legislation             A – tax administration             Ts – tax sharing             Or – own revenue
a For assignation of revenue (tax sharing or own revenue) new OECD test is applied (see OECD, 
2009b). 
b Profit tax in the FB&H is divided between Federal budget (100% tax on profit of companies, 
banks, insurance companies, electricity power industry, post, telecommunications, betting house) 
and cantons (tax on profit of other companies).
c Income tax in the RS is divided between the RS budget (75%) and municipalities (25%). 
d Property tax, depending on cantonal legislation, is distributed entirely to municipalities in can-
ton or it is divided with canton in a ratio prescribed by the cantonal constitutions/laws. 
e Social contributions for employees in B&H institutions are paid into entity extra-budgetary 
funds. Social contributions for pension insurance for employees in District are paid into entity 
Pension Funds according to entity residence of employees.
2.3 distribution of indirect taxes at the bosnia and  
herzegovina level 
The system of financing levels of government in B&H from indirect taxes consists 
of two levels of distribution of indirect tax revenues. The first level of distribution 
is defined by the State Law on Indirect Taxation System in B&H and the second 
by the Entity regulations. 
In accordance with statutory provisions, indirect taxes collected into the Single 
Account (SA) are allocated daily in the order established by the Law. The priority 
in the distribution of indirect tax revenues is the refund to the taxpayers. Budget 
of B&H institutions is financed mostly from indirect taxes with a smaller share of 
the State’s own revenue (non-tax, grants, share profits of the Central Bank and 
others). An equal amount from the Single Account of the ITA is paid in to the 
B&H budget each day, according to the amount of the annual budget of B&H in-
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286 stitutions. Finally, the remaining amount is shared between the Entities and Brčko 
District. External debt is deducted from the amount of the Entities prior to assi-
gning, according to the dynamics set by the repayment schedule of the Ministry of 
Finance and Treasury B&H. The payment of external debt has the priority over 
other budget users. Servicing the external debt is the obligation of Entities but the 
State of B&H is a guarantee of payment obligations to international creditors. For 
this reason, the payment of external debt is realized from the part of indirect taxes 
belonged to Entities but the payment procedure itself is being conducted on behalf 
of the State by the Central Bank as a fiscal agent of B&H. After the payment of 
external debt the rest is transferred to Entities. 
chart 1 
Distribution of indirect taxes in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Source: Law on Indirect Taxation System in B&H (Official Gazette of B&H No. 96/09), Decision 
on temporary allocation of road fees earmarked for highways (Official Gazette of B&H No. 
102/2009), Law on the Repartition of Public Revenues in the FB&H (Official Gazette of the FB&H 
No. 22/06 and 22/09), Law on Budgets (Official Gazette of the RS No. 121/12).
Distribution of revenue from indirect taxes is defined by the Law on Indirect Taxa-
tion System as follows: the share of the remaining amount transferred the Federa-
tion, Republic of Srpska and the District is determined by their share in final 
consumption revealed by value added tax returns. The coefficient of allocation of 
indirect taxes to Entities is calculated in such a way that the final consumption of 
FB&H (RS, BD) revealed by the VAT returns is put in relation with the final con-
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287sumption in B&H as reported on VAT returns. As of 1 July 2007 by the decision 
of the High Representative and in order to protect the fiscal autonomy of the Di-
strict, the District share in the amount of indirect taxes allocated to Entities and the 
District, is fixed at minimum 3.55% and in nominal terms to 124 million KM. 
Since then only coefficients of allocation of indirect taxes to Entities are determi-
ned by the ITA Governing Board. 
After the amount of indirect taxes to the Entities has been assigned, Entities in 
accordance with Entity legislation allocate the funds to the users of the distribu-
tion (Entity budget, cantons in FB&H, municipalities and cities, Directorate of 
Roads). 
In the meantime, on 1 July 2009 amendments to the Law on Excise Duties impo-
sed an additional road fee on oil derivatives, intended for financing the construc-
tion of the highway network and whose distribution to the Entities and District is 
done by special coefficients determined by the ITA Governing Board. The scheme 
of the distribution of indirect taxes is shown in chart 1 (above the line). 
3 characteristics of fiscal system in bosnia and herzegovina
3.1 fiscal management
The main features of the fiscal system in B&H are the complexity of government 
levels, a high degree of decentralization of responsibilities for revenues and ex-
penditures, a weak central government and the asymmetry in the structure of the 
Entity government, where one Entity is fiscally decentralized (FB&H) and the 
other one is centralized (RS). Given the broad fiscal sovereignty of Entities, fiscal 
federalism in B&H in the post-war period had the characteristics of dual federa-
lism. The asymmetry of fiscal structure in B&H has been enhanced by the establi-
shment of the District of Brčko and assigning it a considerable fiscal autonomy. 
On the other hand, the more favorable tax treatment of companies in the District 
in terms of lower sales tax rates in relation to Entities, led to tax competition 
among governments within B&H. The phase of competitive federalism brought 
fiscal expansion to the District as many companies especially the importers of oil 
derivatives transferred their headquarters to the District. Tax competition between 
Entities and the District has been ended by the centralization of indirect taxes at 
the state level. Reform of the indirect tax system has radically changed intergo-
vernmental fiscal relations, contributing to a firmer connection of previously auto-
nomous fiscal authorities. The high degree of fiscal interdependence of all levels 
of government, after the implementation of the reform of indirect taxation, raised 
the issue of fiscal coordination between the levels of government in B&H. On the 
other hand, the process of European integration requires that ‟B&H speaks with 
one voice” which, in the given political relations, means the coordination of levels 
of government not only in the fiscal sphere, but also in all economic, political and 
social issues which require the takeover and implementation of acquis. Therefore, 
B&H is entering a phase of cooperative federalism which its functioning based on 
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288 the cooperation of levels of government. In the given political circumstances, co-
operative federalism is the only possible option on the way towards the EU, al-
though some authors consider cooperative federalism ‟a joint decision-making 
trap” (Watts, 1998). Finally, the reform of indirect taxes has incorporated in the 
fiscal system of B&H executive federalism in the form of the ITA Governing Bo-
ard. Executive federalism is a process in which intergovernmental relations are 
performed by the executive agencies of the federal government and regional go-
vernment, at political and administrative levels (Boadway and Watts, 2000). The 
establishment of the ITA Governing Board means the transfer of jurisdiction from 
the Parliament to the body of executive power in the area of indirect taxes. Deci-
sion making by the finance ministers of B&H and Entities on the policy of indirect 
taxes under the ITA Governing Board represents a direct involvement of executive 
power in intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
After the reform of indirect taxes it became necessary to establish fiscal coordina-
tion between levels of government in B&H. In the beginning (2005) governments 
established the Fiscal Council as a form of informal fiscal coordination. However, 
a strong growth of revenue from indirect taxes caused by the introduction of VAT 
has brought a significant surplus to all levels of government so governments did 
not recognize the need for fiscal coordination until the emergence of fiscal deficit 
in 2008. According to the Law on the Fiscal Council (Official Gazette of B&H, 
No. 63/08) a formal fiscal coordination was established but without any institutio-
nal capacity. The Fiscal Council has six members: the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers and Prime Ministers of the Entities, as well as the Entity and State Mi-
nisters of Finance. The Governor of the Central Bank and a representative of the 
Brčko District Government are observers in the Fiscal Council. The Fiscal 
Council’s task is to coordinate fiscal policy in B&H to ensure macroeconomic 
stability and fiscal sustainability of the State, Entities and the District. It adopts a 
medium-term fiscal policy framework, which includes the fiscal goals of the State, 
Entities and the District, macroeconomic projections, projections of indirect taxes 
and their distribution in the following year and the proposed debt ceiling of B&H, 
Entities and the District. The fiscal goal is limited to the primary budget surplus/
deficit. Decisions of the Fiscal Council are adopted by the majority of five votes, 
but majority must include at least one vote from each of the three constituent pe-
oples. In case of lack of agreement on the fiscal framework, governments are re-
quired to submit a proposal for interim financing in the amount of the budget of 
the previous year. In the event of the budget being exceeded, the government that 
has violated the budgetary framework should transfer 10% of the excess of the 
budget at the expense of special purposes from which the repayment of internal 
debt of the government that violated the rules is financed. 
The existing model of fiscal coordination has numerous functional and substantial 
weaknesses. Inclusion of Prime Ministers in the composition of the Fiscal Council 
reduces the effectiveness of the Council, which can affect the shift of the focus of 
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289work from fiscal issues to political debates. Furthermore, the mechanism of vo-
ting, which includes elements of nationalism, can lead to a blockade of the work 
of the Fiscal Council in the event that one nation in the Council is represented by 
only one member. Fundamental weaknesses relate to the comprehensiveness of 
fiscal coordination and weakness of the sanctions mechanism. Unlike B&H and 
Entities, the District in the Fiscal Council has the role of an observer and has no 
right to decide but takes over the obligations and can be sanctioned as well as the 
Entities and State. Completely out of the coordination system remained the can-
tons and local communities, which together account for 28% of total tax revenue 
in B&H as well as other government and quasi-governmental units such as extra-
budgetary funds. The fiscal goal is limited only to the primary budget surplus/de-
ficit where capital expenditures and receipts are not taken into account. The fiscal 
goal excludes the surpluses/deficits of internationally funded projects. By defining 
fiscal goals in this way a large part of expenditure remains out of the control of the 
Fiscal Council which is the channel for ‟accounting gymnastics”, i.e. showing 
current expenditures within the capital that are not under control. The sanction 
involving extracting 10% of the excess in a separate account from which internal 
debts are financed (for example, old foreign currency savings, material and non-
material war damage, etc.) can be seen as a form of forced savings of government, 
which in any case must at some point pay off the debt, rather than a penalty for 
violation of the agreed framework. The mechanism of sanctions does not include 
personal penalisation, as in some other countries (Ter-Minassian, 1997; Joumard 
and Kongsrud, 2003), which in the case of B&H could be more effective than in-
troduced sanctions. This raises the question of the efficiency of sanctioning the 
B&H central government and the District government if it is known that internal 
debt is the Entity debt. Finally, the Council’s decisions, though legally established, 
are de facto not mandatory for the Presidency of B&H which proposes the budget 
of the institutions of B&H and Parliaments of B&H and Entities which adopt 
budgets so that the implementation of the Council’s decisions depends on the ba-
lance of power of the ruling political structures in the institutions that make deci-
sions on budgets. 
3.2 fiscal autonomy 
To assess the quality of fiscal federalism in B&H it is important to look at the 
structure of the tax system. The tax structure in B&H is characterized by the histo-
rical legacy from the socialist system and the low level of economic development. 
The result of these two factors is the predominance of indirect taxes. The introduc-
tion of VAT has deepened the gap between indirect and direct taxes. Finally, 
 integration processes (CEFTA, EU) have diminished the importance of customs 
duties, and increased the importance of excise duties. In general, all the listed 
factors have contributed to the increasing dominance of indirect taxes in the tax 
structure in B&H (table 2). 
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290 table 2 
Structure of revenues in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011
% GDP % B&H revenues
Indirect taxes 19.3 43.2
 VAT 12.1 28.2
 Excises 4.9 11.3
 Road fees 1.1 2.6
 Customs 1.1 2.5
 Other 0.1 0.2
Direct taxes 3.5 8.1
 Profit tax 1.1 2.5
 Income tax 2.0 4.7
 Other direct taxes 0.4 0.9
Social contributions 15.6 36.2
Non-tax revenue 5.1 11.8
Other (other revenue, transfers, grants) 0.2 0.7
Source: Database of Macroeconomic Analysis Unit (MAU) of the ITA Governing Board.
Measuring the degree of fiscal decentralization in B&H and in a sample of com-
plex countries on the basis of the share of central government and government at 
lower levels in revenues (table 3) indicates the extremely weak fiscal autonomy at 
the state level (central government) and extremely strong fiscal position of middle 
level of government which consists of entities, cantons and the District (Antić, 
2009). 
table 3 
Revenue, as % of GDP, 2005
Austria Belgium B&H Canada Germany USA Spain Switzerland
Tax revenue
GG 27.7 30.4 25.3 29.0 21.9 18.8 21.4 22.4
CG 20.4 25.8 3.0 14.0 10.8 9.8 11.8 10.0
SNG 7.3 4.6 22.3 15.0 11.1 9.0 9.7 12.1
Social contributions
GG 16.3 16.5 13.2 5.5 17.8 7.0 12.8 7.7
CG 15.4 15.1 4.5 17.1 6.8 12.7 7.7
SNG 1.0 1.4 13.2 1.0 0.8 0.2 0.1
Other revenue
GG 4.9 4.4 5.3 6.6 3.3 5.8 2.8 8.3
CG 2.4 2.8 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.5 1.5 1.6
SNG 2.5 1.6 4.7 5.4 2.6 5.3 1.2 6.6
GG – general government CG – central government SNG – sub-national governments
Source: Antić, 2009.
Comparison of the degree of fiscal decentralization in B&H with recent measure-
ments made by the IMF for 63 countries based on a set of four indicators (Dziobek 
et al., 2011a), confirms the presented finding of an extremely weak central 
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291 government in B&H, which has less authority than any of the other countries, re-
gardless of the category (European, unitary, federal), except for spending on staff 
salaries (table 4). 
table 4 
Fiscal decentralization indicators, CG/GGa, 2008
Indicators  
(in percent)
B&H All  
countriesb
Federal 
countriesc
Unitary 
countriesd
European 
countries
Revenues 8 47 72 90 84e
Tax Effortg 7 48 76 91 87e
Expenditures 7 35 62 81 73f
Compensation of employees 18 12 37 73 59f
a CG – central government (middle level) + national social security funds; GG – general 
government.
b Lowest ratio for 63 countries.
c Mean for 8 federal countries.
d Mean for 55 federal countries.
e Mean for 36 countries.
f Mean for 37 countries.
g Tax effort = tax revenue + social contributions.
Source: B&H – author’s calculation based on MAU Database, ITA Governing Board; Other 
countries (Dziobek et al., 2011a).
Fiscal autonomy of local communities is very low considering that the share of 
revenue on which they decide entirely (non-tax revenue) or partially (tax on pro-
perty) is low. In the analysis of fiscal autonomy it is not possible to apply the 
standard OECD synthetic typology (OECD, 2009a) to determine the degree of 
fiscal autonomy of lower levels, due to the fiscal interdependence of the go-
vernment levels. If fiscal autonomy is measured by the discretionary indicator 
(Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003), which is calculated as percentage of tax revenues 
of lower level of government where the Government has 100% control over the 
rate and/or base, then we come to the interesting conclusion that the fiscal auto-
nomy in B&H is quite low at all levels and that B&H institutions, as nucleus of the 
central government, do not have any discretionary power in making the tax laws 
(table 5). 
table 5 
Discretion degree of sub-national governments, in %, 2006
Discretion  
degree
Municip.
RS 
Budget 
RS
Municip. 
FB&H 
Cantons Budget 
FB&H
BD Total 
degree
2006a 0.47 18.84 3.78 5.07 5.23 17.78 15.43
2011b 0.44 23.81 2.97 6.51 4.09 9.91 16.00
a Source: Antić, 2009.
b Source: Author’s calculation based on MAU Database, ITA Governing Board.
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292 The reform of indirect taxes in B&H has strengthened the single economic space 
but on the other hand, it has increased the interdependence of the government le-
vels because of the centralization of indirect taxes, which are the main source of 
funding for all levels of government in B&H. However, compared with other 
complex countries, the process of the centralization of taxes in B&H was not ac-
companied by the centralization of authority for expenditures and by any streng-
thening of the central government. Besides the defence reform and the establi-
shment of agencies and directorates necessary for European integration, all major 
responsibilities are assigned to Entities and cantons. Despite the centralization of 
legislation and administration in the area of indirect taxation, Entities retained a 
certain influence on the policy of indirect taxation through the representation on 
the ITA Governing Board. Entities in this specific body have the right of veto on 
changes of legislation related to indirect taxes that originally belong to Entities 
(taxation of goods and services, excise tax), while the State has the right of veto in 
decision-making on customs revenues that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
B&H. Furthermore, the fiscal autonomy of the District is protected by the Law, 
even though the District has no right to decide within the ITA Governing Board. 
The specific impact of State and Entities in the area of indirect taxes is reflected in 
the fact that without the consent of the ITA Governing Board any legislation in the 
field of indirect taxation cannot be passed in the Parliamentary Assembly of B&H. 
Despite a modest revenue share the decision-making capacity of B&H has been 
strengthened, because the level of B&H decides, through the ITA Governing Bo-
ard, on the shares of Entities in indirect taxes. At the same time, Entities through 
the Entity voting in the House of Representatives in Parliament of B&H directly 
impact the budget of B&H institutions and thus on the height of part of the B&H 
budget funded from the ITA SA. 
A general assessment is that due to the specific system of indirect tax distribution 
and the low share of direct taxes in B&H, all levels of government have quite 
weak fiscal autonomy, which implies a high degree of fiscal interdependence 
between levels of government and the need for fiscal coordination. In order to 
meet the specific situation in B&H, it will be necessary in OECD typology to add 
another criterion: degree of fiscal autonomy of government level in the group of 
revenue division (d.5), which would indicate revenue distribution with the con-
sent of both levels of government. 
4 fiscal trends in bosnia and herzegovina 
The complex structure of government in B&H has contributed to exaggeration of 
public services and administration in B&H, with the effect of duplication and 
overlapping of public services, loss of public sector efficiency and effectiveness. 
The relatively high level of public spending, measured by percentage of GDP, as 
a result of the complex political-territorial organization of B&H and the high 
 degree of fiscal decentralization of B&H, also had an impact on the country’s 
 fiscal picture in the form of high tax burden. Besides these factors, trends of 
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293 consolidated  revenue of general government of B&H in the period ever since the 
end of the war (1996) have been affected by the process and reforms in the fiscal 
and economic sphere. Systemic reforms that led to strengthening the market and 
reducing the gray economy, such as the creation of a single economic space after 
the abolition of double taxation of inter-entity trade and taxation of the imports of 
excise goods at the border, and then reform of the indirect taxation system, which 
was completed by the introduction of VAT, positively affected revenue growth in 
the period 2004-2008. Besides, the enormous price growth of energy products, 
raw materials and food on the world market during 2008 has led to a strong nomi-
nal growth in revenues from indirect taxes (customs, VAT) which are calculated 
ad valorem in the second and third quarters of 2008. On the other hand, there has 
been a significant loss of the customs revenue because of accession to joining 
CEFTA (2006) and the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement 
with the EU (since 1 July 2008) (chart 2). 
chart 2 
Collection of taxes (in billions KM)
Property tax Customs duty Income/profit tax Excises/road fees VAT/sales tax
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
2011201020092008200720062005
Source: Indirect Taxation Authority: MAU Database, ITA Governing Board.
The fact that the beginning of five-year implementation of the phase reduction of 
customs duties on imports from the EU coincided with the beginning of the crisis 
greatly complicates the process of fiscal consolidation. The introduction of addi-
tional road fees from the price of oil derivatives as of 1 July 2007, and the conti-
nued increase of excise rates on tobacco products in accordance with the  minimum 
standards of the EU since 2009 were not enough to neutralize negative effects of 
the crisis on the level of consumption and economic activity in the country. The 
specific fiscal architecture of B&H and decision-making within the ITA Gover-
ning Board determined the range of fiscal measures undertaken by the authorities 
in the area of indirect taxes after 2008. There were no changes in the area of VAT 
because the proposed measures were divergent, depending on the economic and 
political interests of the Entities (for instance, FB&H advocated the standard rate 
increase and RS the introduction of differentiated rates), so the single VAT rate of 
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294 17% has remained. The same situation occurred with RS initiatives for the intro-
duction of ‟blue diesel” while FB&H advocated refunds to the farmers from the 
budget. The only consensus was reached with the gradual increase of excise taxes 
on cigarettes in line with the EU minimum rate. Some positive effects on revenues 
from customs duties are expected in 2013 after Croatia joins the EU. 
Given the limitations of changes in the policy of indirect taxes, the Entities and 
Brčko District have focused on changes to direct taxes (income tax, profit tax, and 
property tax). The reform of direct taxes has included, inter alia, the introduction 
of a global (synthetic) model of income taxation, aligning profit taxation with in-
ternational practice, reform of taxing property in RS and Brčko (abolishing inhe-
ritance and gift tax, introduction of a property register and using market value for 
the tax base), using modern IT platform, procedures and technique, establishment 
of single registers of taxpayers, etc. The mentioned reform has resulted in some 
degree of internal harmonization of direct taxes in B&H and the elimination of 
double internal taxation. 
Reforms in the sphere of direct taxes implemented by the Entity governments in 
the period 2006-2009 occurred during the crisis and were unable to achieve the 
expected results (chart 2). The income tax rate in FB&H has been increased from 
5% to 10%, while the profit tax rate was reduced from 30% to 10%. RS has chan-
ged the income tax rate several times and finally, in 2011, it was increased from 
8% to 10%. In 2011 taxation of income and profit in the District was harmonized 
with Entities although there are differences in exemptions, deductions and allo-
wances. For example, in FB&H and the District there is a personal deduction 
while it was abolished in RS as of 2011. During 2012 RS and Brčko District intro-
duced profit tax exemptions for investing in production and hiring new workers. 
The effects of these measures on government budgets and economies are unpre-
dictable because the poor political climate in B&H discourages foreign investors. 
On the other hand, financing the local level in RS is uncertain because of the 
comprehensive property tax reform in RS, which started in 2012. 
Growth in revenue from indirect taxes in 2006 and 2007 launched a spiral of ex-
penses of a complex administrative apparatus and social benefits at all levels of 
government (chart 3). Obligations created under collective agreements and laws 
on social rights quickly melted fiscal surpluses from 2006 and 2007. Because of 
the rigidity of wages and social benefits that are regulated by Entity laws, go-
vernments were not able to respond quickly to the revenue decline caused by the 
economic crisis and implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agree-
ment with the EU. Stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund 
from 2009 (IMF, 2010a) was only partially carried out, since the government had 
no power to enforce a savings program due to political aims.
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295chart 3 
Trends in revenues and expenditures as % of GDP
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, 16 July 2012. 
Rising expenses combined with a revenue decline in B&H in 2009 led to a fiscal 
deficit of 5.7% of GDP which, due to a moderate increase in revenue from indirect 
taxes and decrease of expenditures, undertaken in accordance with the commit-
ments from the stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund, 
amounted to 4.5% of GDP in 2010 and 3.1% of GDP in 2011. Fiscal deficit in 
Entities were financed by the receipts from privatization (RS) and by new bor-
rowings (FB&H, RS) under unfavorable conditions. The consequence of this po-
licy was the increase of total public debt from 31% of GDP in 2008 to 43% of 
GDP in 2011. The IMF estimates that B&H may not get out from the negative 
zone before 2016.
5 fiscal position of governments in bosnia and herzegovina 
during the global economic crisis 
5.1 factors affecting the budgets of government levels  
in bosnia and herzegovina 
Under the influence of divergent processes in global public finance – the centrali-
zation of revenue and processes of decentralization of expenditures – today, many 
of the factors listed are beyond the scope of measures of local and regional go-
vernment, which reduces the possibility of effective and efficient response to the 
economic crisis. A similar process has affected the governments in B&H. The re-
duction of the fiscal sovereignty of the Entities and Brčko District and the increase 
 the interdependence of government heightened the vulnerability of the budgetary 
positions of the sub-national governments in relation to fluctuations in revenues 
caused by the global crisis. Sub-national governments do not have instruments 
that can affect the major part of the source of revenue for financing. Indirect taxes, 
the most powerful lever, have been moved to the State level. The complexity of 
the procedure for amendments to regulations in the field of indirect taxes prevents 
rapid response of government to fiscal shocks. On the other hand, the vertical 
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296  system of indirect tax distribution is very complex, because it involves all levels 
of government, external debt and indirect tax refunds. 
The fiscal position of sub-national governments is indirectly influenced by factors 
derived from the model of the distribution of indirect taxes (see chart 1). The first 
factor affecting the distribution is the level of indirect tax refunds. Given that re-
funds are the Achilles heel of the VAT system in each country, the increase of re-
funds due to VAT frauds directly decreases transfers of indirect taxes to the levels 
of government. Furthermore, the increase of the B&H budget decreases transfers 
to levels of governments and vice versa. Due to the failure to adopt the B&H bud-
get during 2011, the share of B&H institutions was kept at the level of 2006, 
which allowed the overflow of revenue from indirect taxes to the Entities and the 
District. 
The model of allocation of indirect tax revenues based on the final consumption 
introduces purely economic criteria in the revenue allocation. The established in-
terdependence of governments is reflected in the fiscal position so that a relative 
increase in final consumption in one Entity, which is the result of more favorable 
economic developments in that Entity, leads to a reduction in the share of indirect 
taxes in the other Entity and vice versa. As consequence, in the preparation of 
budget frameworks governments cannot accurately predict shares in indirect 
taxes, which makes it hard to draft the projection of the budget of lower go-
vernment levels and in general makes the negotiating process for the budget fra-
mework of the general government of B&H very unreliable and uncertain. 
Another problem is the process of adopting allocation coefficients. According to 
current regulations the ITA Governing Board should determine allocation coeffi-
cients between the Entities quarterly. Should there be a failure to adopt the deci-
sion, coefficients from the previous quarter have to be applied. The regulations 
also provide for the first temporary settlement for six months of the current year 
and second temporary settlement for the previous year. After the external audit 
final settlement between the Entities is performed. So far, it has often happened 
that the Governing Board cannot reach an agreement and so the old coefficients 
are applied. As the deviations of the actual coefficients from those applied are 
larger, the calculated amounts of the settlements are larger as well. Settlements are 
unpredictable because they are subject to political agreements. They are always 
carried out with a large time lag; in the event of the accumulation of high amounts 
of annual settlements, this will endanger the fiscal position of the Entity that needs 
to return funds to the other Entity. 
5.2 analytical approach
In order to illustrate in the best way the changes in the fiscal position of sub-natio-
nal governments in B&H after the outbreak of the global economic and financial 
crisis, a comparison of fiscal reports of government levels for pre-crisis 2008 and 
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2972011 by the major items of revenues and expenditures has been made. Analysis of 
the fiscal structure in B&H can be carried out horizontally, by decomposition of 
the consolidated fiscal balance of the general government to the central go-
vernments but also it can be done vertically, by decomposition of fiscal reports of 
government levels within the Entities (see appendix, chart A2). 
It should be noted that according to the IMF methodology the general government 
of B&H consists of the central government and local governments (IMF, 2005). 
The central government includes budget institutions (B&H institutions, budget of 
FB&H, ten cantons in FB&H, budget of RS and Brčko District), extra-budgetary 
institutions of the Entities and the District and extra-budgetary social funds in the 
Entities and the District (see appendix, chart A3). The local level includes 80 mu-
nicipalities in FB&H and 63 municipalities in RS. Reporting according to IMF 
format includes also fiscal operations of the Entity Directorates for Roads finan-
ced from indirect taxes, then revenue and expenditures of international projects. 
Official reports of governments in B&H do not usually include Directorates for 
Roads and international projects, and, given their great importance to internatio-
nal projects that finance the reconstruction in B&H, this resulted in significant 
differences between the government and IMF reports in terms of fiscal deficit, 
around 2% of GDP at present. 
5.3 general government of bosnia and herzegovina 
In general, the largest share in collected revenues and expenditures of the general 
government of B&H (table 6) goes to the Federation of B&H, as a result of the 
economic development and population growth. GDP of FB&H accounts for two 
thirds of the GDP of the State. Similarly, FB&H has twice the population of RS, 
which results in social benefits and transfers. In addition, the complex federal 
structure of FB&H has resulted in high administrative expenses. The share of ca-
pital expenditures in the RS is higher than in the FB&H. This is the result of diver-
gent economic trends in Entities in recent years, as well as the different tax policy 
and policy of investment and privatization of strategic state-owned companies. 
The process of privatization of the telecom in the RS, just before the outbreak of 
the crisis, has brought significant resources that RS invested in the private compa-
nies, housing and infrastructure and partly covered the deficit in the extra–budge-
tary funds and public corporations (for example, railways). On the other hand, the 
share of direct taxes is almost the same, except that the tax burden increased in RS 
in the last three years. Similarly, reforms in the system of social contributions in 
Entities brought the increase in the tax burden and also the increase of the propor-
tion of RS due to the increase of rate and expansion of the base. 
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298 table 6 
Share of governments, % of revenue and expenditure
2008 2011
B&H BD FB&H RS B&H BD FB&H RS
Total revenue 8.0 2.2 60.0 29.9 7.6 2.1 57.7 32.6
 Indirect taxes 13.8 3.2 55.4 27.6 14.3 3.2 53.5 29.0
 Direct taxes 0.0 1.9 56.3 41.8 0.0 1.9 51.5 46.7
 Tax on profits 0.0 3.2 48.9 47.8 0.0 2.1 49.7 48.2
 Tax on income 0.0 1.4 57.1 41.4 0.0 1.9 49.8 48.4
 Other direct taxes 0.0 0.6 68.1 31.3 0.0 1.2 66.3 32.5
 Social contributions 0.0 0.6 69.2 30.2 0.0 0.8 65.5 33.7
 Non-tax revenue 7.1 3.3 57.7 31.8 10.6 2.2 54.0 33.2
Total expenditure 7.2 1.7 62.3 28.8 7.8 1.9 57.8 32.5
 Expense 7.2 1.8 62.4 28.7 8.0 1.8 58.9 31.3
 Wages and compensation 18.2 2.3 53.5 25.9 19.5 2.4 50.2 28.0
 Use for goods and services 7.8 3.4 59.9 28.8 8.7 3.7 72.3 15.4
 Grants, subsidies 0.9 0.8 63.5 44.0 0.9 0.8 63.5 44.0
 Interest 0.2 0.0 50.3 49.4 0.2 0.3 59.1 40.5
 Other expense 7.2 0.0 59.7 33.1 2.6 1.7 69.2 26.4
 Net acquisition of  
 nonfinancial assets 
9.3 6.1 41.1 43.5 4.4 2.8 33.0 59.8
Source: MAU Database, ITA Governing Board.
5.4 consolidated central governments 
Vertical analysis of the fiscal position of governments in B&H is based on the 
decomposition of the government sector to the constitutional system: the institu-
tions of B&H, Brčko District, consolidated FB&H (FB&H budget, cantons, mu-
nicipalities and cities and extra-budgetary funds) and consolidated RS (RS bud-
get, municipalities and cities and extra-budgetary funds). Analysis of revenue 
structure of the government levels in B&H (table 7) shows similar shares of indi-
rect taxes in the Entities, except in the case of the institutions of B&H and Brčko 
District. 
table 7 
Consolidated central governments revenue, as % of revenue, 2011 
Institutions 
of B&H
BD Consol. 
FB&H
Consol.  
RS
Indirect taxes 81.2 65.5 40.1 38.4
Direct taxes 0.0 7.2 7.2 11.6
   Tax on profits 0.0 2.5 2.2 3.8
   Tax on income 0.0 4.2 4.0 6.9
   Other direct taxes 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.9
Social contributions 0.0 14.4 41.1 37.4
Non-tax revenue 16.5 12.5 11.1 12.0
Other (other revenue, transfers, grants) 2.2 0.3 0.6 0.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: All users of indirect tax distribution in B&H are included except for Directorates for Roads. 
Source: Reports of MAU, ITA Governing Board, www.oma.uino.gov.ba.
d
in
k
a a
n
t
ić:
m
u
lt
i-l
e
v
e
l fisc
a
l sy
st
e
m
 in b
o
sn
ia a
n
d h
e
r
z
e
g
o
v
in
a: e
v
o
l
u
t
io
n a
n
d c
o
pin
g w
it
h e
c
o
n
o
m
ic c
r
isis
f
in
a
n
c
ia
l t
h
e
o
r
y a
n
d 
p
r
a
c
t
ic
e
37 (3) 279-310 (2013)
299Since the Federation of B&H is a fiscally complex structure as well, it is intere-
sting to analyze the distribution of revenues by levels of government within the 
FB&H (table 8). It is obvious that the budgets of FB&H and cantons are mainly 
sensitive to an increase of indirect taxes while cantons are the most sensitive to the 
movements of direct taxes. The main incomes of the local communities in FB&H 
are the non-tax revenues and property tax. 
table 8 
Consolidated FB&H revenue per level of government, as % of revenue, 2011
Type of revenue Budget FB&H Cantons Municipalities
Direct taxes 10.0 65.7 24.3
   Taxes on income and profits 12.0 73.6 14.4
   Taxes on income of individuals 0.0 77.4 22.6
   Taxes on profits of companies 0.0 99.9 0.1
   Other income taxes 100.0 0.0 0.0
Taxes on payroll and workforce 0.0 70.6 29.4
Taxes on property 0.0 16.2 83.8
Indirect taxes (including road fees) 42.2 50.4 7.5
Other taxes 1.8 67.7 30.6
Non-tax revenue 29.2 33.9 31.6
Source: MAU Database, ITA Governing Board.
Analysing the fiscal position of consolidated Entity governments in 2011 compa-
red to 2008 (see appendix, table A1) we see a trend of the revenue decrease in 
FB&H and revenue increase in RS, measured as a share of GDP, as a result of tax 
reforms in Entities and the growth of coefficient of indirect tax distribution in fa-
vour of RS. Fiscal consolidation, imposed by the IMF under the stand-by arrange-
ment from 2009 (IMF, 2010a) has brought expenditure cutting in FB&H, mainly 
in the item of social benefits and transfers to sub-national governments. In con-
trast, there was an increase in expenditures in RS induced by the financing from 
the telecom privatisation receipts. 
5.5 sub-national governments in entities 
Analysis of the fiscal position of sub-national governments in 2011 compared to 
2008 is based on fiscal reports for each level of government (the Entity budgets, 
cantons in FB&H, municipalities and cities). Comprehensive analysis of the local 
governments finance in the European countries during the crisis (Davey, 2011) 
shows that revenues were more volatile at the upper levels of sub-national go-
vernments than at the local level. However, the data from both Entities in B&H 
shows the opposite trend. From consolidated reports (see appendix, table A2) we 
can note a negative trend in the nominal revenue reduction in cantons and muni-
cipalities of FB&H in relation to the budget of the Federation, in which revenue 
was increased. Revenues of cantons and municipalities are lower than in 2008 due 
to a reduction of income tax. The local level in FB&H is further affected by a si-
gnificant reduction of property taxes, although it is a specific tax (according to the 
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300 area of the property) and by the reduction of subsidies and transfers received from 
the Federation and cantons. The drop of intergovernmental grants to sub-national 
governments was higher than decrease of own tax revenues, which is in the line 
with the conclusion of the OECD analysis that intergovernmental grants were 
more volatile than own tax revenues (Blöchliger, 2010a).
The federal level has significantly reduced expenditures, which, together with the 
increased revenues, has reduced the fiscal deficit. The expenditure reduction is 
evident in cantons as well, but in a smaller proportion. The expenditure structure 
analysis indicates that the reduction has been made in grants, subsidies and tran-
sfers to sub-national governments and to capital expenditures. On the other hand, 
wages at the level of FB&H and cantons have not been cut and material expenses 
have been reduced to a lesser extent. It is interesting that the local level has incre-
ased wage expenditures at the expense of the social benefits that are the responsi-
bility of local communities. 
Compared with 2008, RS has accomplished the nominal revenue increase at the 
level of government budget on the basis of direct tax growth, the growth in the 
share of indirect tax distribution and completed settlements for 2009-2011 (see 
appendix, table A3). However, municipalities have less revenue due to reduced 
transfers of indirect taxes, decrease of property tax and non-tax revenue. The in-
crease in social contribution rates, abolition of personal allowance for income tax 
and the introduction of fiscal cash registers in RS, which was initiated in 2008, led 
to the closure of many small businesses, which reduced both the tax and the non-
tax revenue of the RS budget and local communities. 
In 2011, the fiscal position of the RS budget improved due to revenue growth and 
expenditure decrease, while the fiscal deficit of local level was reduced. Fiscal 
consolidation in RS brought a significant reduction in the RS budget expenditures. 
Expenditure reduction has been carried out on material expenditures, grants and 
social transfers, while expenses for salaries and capital expenditures were increa-
sed. Local communities have retained their wage expenditures at the same level, 
while at the same time they reduced grants and social transfers as well as capital 
expenditures. 
6 the crisis as impetus for reforming of the concept  
of fiscal coordination in bosnia and herzegovina
The time from the occurrence of the crisis to date has shown up the stated we-
aknesses of existing system of fiscal coordination in B&H. Autonomous reforms 
of direct taxation implemented by Entities have jeopardized employment, foreign 
investments and achieved a level of internal tax harmonization. A weak central 
government at the State level and a loose fiscal coordination within the Fiscal 
Council could not affect the policy of wages and social benefits in the Entities and 
at the local level or prevent increasing disharmony in Entity tax policies. The po-
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301litical turbulences in the country have prevented the Fiscal Council from determi-
ning the state’s share of indirect taxes in B&H and adopting the fiscal goals and 
medium-term fiscal framework of B&H for the period 2011-2014, which is why 
the institutions of B&H were on temporary funding through whole 2011 while the 
entities created their budgets autonomously. The budget crisis culminated at the 
beginning of 2012 when the failure to adopt the budget of the B&H institutions for 
2012 led to a freeze on foreign debt payments although there were funds from the 
allocation of indirect taxes set aside for that purpose. However, in order to meet 
the requirements for obtaining financial assistance from the EU, the IMF and the 
World Bank, the Fiscal Council succeeded in May 2012 in reaching an agreement 
on medium-term allocations of indirect taxes for the budget of B&H institutions 
and global fiscal framework of the general government of B&H for the period 
2012-2015. 
Growth of debt and the slow recovery of the economy, on the one hand, and diver-
gent fiscal measures adopted during 2012, with uncertain effects, without cutting 
current expenditures, could, in terms of the existing loose and casual fiscal coor-
dination, very often initiated and urged by International Community, deepen the 
fiscal deficit of sub-national governments in B&H still further. Moreover, having 
given up on the implementation of the single debt ceiling in B&H from 18% of 
total revenue in the summer of 2012, the RS Government has tied the debt ceiling 
to GDP, creating extra space for borrowing in this entity. In conditions of the in-
crease of borrowing and low credit rating the authorities reached a new arrange-
ment with the IMF of 410 million EUR in September 2012. The main obligations 
under a new stand-by agreement include, inter alia, cutting wages and social be-
nefits and subsidies, better targeted social policies, establishing a more effective 
fiscal coordination and medium-term fiscal planning, removing blockages in the 
distribution of indirect taxes and funding the B&H budget and external debt (IMF, 
2012). The obligations imposed on B&H are promising for the citizens from the 
standpoint of reducing government spending, strengthening the State position in 
fiscal relations and implementing the long expected reforms of expenditure poli-
cies. It should finally relax the fiscal position of sub-national governments, while 
ensuring an efficient and equitable system of social benefits in B&H. However, 
due to the announcement of more rigorous requirements for the payment of the 
next IMF tranche, the agreement reached within the Fiscal Council from May 
2012 could be questionable. 
Failures of the Fiscal Council to ensure, in the past four years, a coordinated fiscal 
response to the global economic crisis indicate the need for a serious reform of the 
current concept of fiscal coordination. In principle, the reformed model of fiscal 
coordination in B&H should be at the same time politically sustainable, economi-
cally efficient and able to anticipate obligations of B&H in the EU accession pro-
cess. Since B&H is, due to specific political and fiscal relations, more similar to 
the EU than it is to other complex countries, the reformed model should be based 
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302 on the concept of harmonization and coordination supported by the EU member 
states (Šimović, 2007), i.e. on the cooperative fiscal federalism. However, unlike 
other complex countries in the EU with a developed democracy and a high level 
of fiscal responsibilities, in which governments respect the obligations arising 
from the national fiscal agreement even though fiscal coordination is not required 
(European Commission, 2012), political agreement is not enough for the go-
vernments in B&H and they must be obliged by the law to respect fiscal targets 
and frameworks. In order for decisions of the Fiscal Council to be binding on the 
Presidency and Parliaments, in terms of budgetary frameworks, the institutionali-
zation of the Fiscal Council is required as a form of executive federalism which 
would include the mechanism of decision making similar to existing voting me-
chanism of the Governing Board of the ITA. Adoption of fiscal target and budge-
tary framework should be preceded by discussion that would necessarily involve 
the budget committees of the B&H Parliaments and Entities, most cantons, asso-
ciations of local communities and the biggest extra-budgetary funds. Reform of 
the concept of fiscal coordination in B&H should also include redefining the fiscal 
target in terms of its determination related to consolidated income and expendi ture 
(current and capital) of all levels of administration, including deficits in internatio-
nal projects, operations of local communities, state-owned development banks 
and corporations that are generously financed from the budget (for example 
railways), and prescribing the uniform debt ceiling of borrowing for B&H and 
entities. Automation of current distribution of indirect taxes without the interven-
tion of the ITA GB would substantially relax the work of the Fiscal Council and 
make the budget projections of lower level governments more reliable. Finally, 
the effectiveness of fiscal coordination cannot be achieved without fiscal disci-
pline at all levels of government, effective monitoring of fiscal operations and 
sanctions for non-compliance with the fiscal framework for collectives and re-
sponsible individuals in governments. 
7 conclusion
The crisis has confirmed the opinions of theoreticians that the distribution of the 
main responsibilities between levels of administration in complex countries, 
advocated by the theory of fiscal federalism, is incapable of preventing a negative 
impact of fiscal decentralization on macroeconomic management. It is necessary 
to introduce fiscal coordination as an institutional glue to harmonize budgets and 
fiscal operations of all levels of government with national fiscal targets. 
The analyse of the fiscal system in B&H, its performance and response to the 
crisis has pointed out the main drawbacks of the complex and highly decentralized 
fiscal system in B&H. Autonomous and uncoordinated actions of Entities in time 
of economic crisis worsened the fiscal position of B&H. The current model of 
loose fiscal coordination, based on political agreement of Entities, usually induced 
by the international community, has elicited only temporary compliance from the 
governments. The divergent functioning of the fiscal system in B&H that plunged 
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303the country into indebtedness, jeopardizing the prospects of economic recovery, 
has raised the need to design an alternative model of fiscal coordination that would 
harmonise Entity fiscal policy with national fiscal goals.
The hypothesis of this paper was that only comprehensive, institutionalized and 
binding fiscal coordination between levels of government can ensure a coherent 
response of B&H to the challenges of the economic crisis. 
Taking into account the complex fiscal setting and serious political constraints, it 
is necessary to establish a multi-tier system of fiscal coordination, involving all 
interested parties in the process of negotiating budgetary frameworks and national 
fiscal targets. 
Request for institutionalization of fiscal coordination means that the Fiscal Council 
should be transformed from a political body to the main fiscal institution deciding 
on overall national fiscal policy. 
An alternative model of fiscal coordination should meet two requirements in order 
to be feasible: it should reconcile a high degree of fiscal autonomy of the Entities 
and a need for better macroeconomic management of the state government. In 
order to meet those requirements a new model of fiscal coordination in B&H 
should take into consideration the characteristics of the cooperative and executive 
fiscal federalism. However, the cooperation between the State and Entities, esta-
blished within the Fiscal Council, is necessary but not sufficient for adherence of 
the governments to the national fiscal goals. Unlike other complex countries, in 
which the federal government is responsible for fiscal coordination and monito-
ring of fiscal operations of lower levels, the state level in B&H is not powerful 
enough to run fiscal coordination. Bearing in mind that without extensive modifi-
cation of the constitutional system it is not possible to delegate to the state addi-
tional fiscal responsibilities for macroeconomic policy it is necessary to incorpo-
rate executive fiscal federalism into intergovernmental fiscal relations in B&H, 
similarly to the model applied in the indirect taxation system. Therefore it is ne-
cessary to assign the Fiscal Council executive fiscal powers regarding the setting 
of the national fiscal targets, fiscal rules and a budgetary framework binding on all 
levels of governments and their parliaments. It would help not only in fiscal con-
solidation and economic performance but also in a reduction of the political ten-
sions in the country and faster fulfilment of obligations in the EU integration pro-
cess.
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304 appendix
chart a1 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, political structure
Abbreviations: 
 
B&H – Bosnia and Herzegovina
FB&H – Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
 RS – Republic of Srpska 
B&H
BD
RSFB&H
10 cantons
Municipalities and  
cities (63)
Municipalities and  
cities (80)
chart a2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, levels of central government
Gove e t
Central  
rnm n  
B&H 
institutions FB&H
 RS  BD
 
 
FB&H budget 
  
 
Social Security
Funds
 
RS budget 
Social Security 
Funds  
BD budget  
Social Security 
Funds 
Pension Fund 
Health Fund 
Unemployment 
Fund 
Pension Fund 
Health Fund 
Unemployment 
Fund 
Child Protection 
Fund
 
Health Fund
Unemployment 
Fund
Directorate  
for Roads
Directorate  
for Roads
Note: Presentation based on IMF GFS analytical approach.
Source: IMF, 2005.
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305chart a3 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, institutional levels of general government
Social Security Funds 
of the FB&H
Social Security Funds 
of Brčko District
RS (entity sub- 
national level)
Source: IMF, 2005.
table a1 
Consolidated entity governments as % of GDP
2008 2011
Consolidated
FB&H RS FB&H RS
Revenue 26.5 13.2 24.8 14.1
Indirect taxes 10.9 5.5 10.0 5.4
Direct taxes 2.1 1.6 1.8 1.6
   Profits tax 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
   Income tax 1.2 0.8 1.0 1.0
   Property tax 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1
Social contributions 10.1 4.4 10.2 5.3
Non-tax revenue 2.9 1.6 2.7 1.7
Other 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
Expenditure 27.9 13.7 25.6 14.4
Current expenditures 26.7 12.3 25.0 13.3
   Wages and compensation 6.5 3.1 6.4 3.6
   Use of goods and services 5.6 2.7 5.8 1.2
   Grants 14.0 6.0 11.2 7.7
   Interest payments and other compensations 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
   Other expenses 0.3 0.2 1.2 0.8
Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets 1.3 1.3 0.6 1.1
Gross operating balance -0.2 0.9 -0.2 0.8
Net lending/borrowing -1.4 -0.5 -0.8 -0.3
Source: MAU Database, ITA Governing Board.
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306 table a2 
Sub-national governments in FB&H as % of GDP
 
2008 2011
Budget 
FB&H
Cantons Munici-
palities
Budget 
FB&H
Cantons Munici-
palities 
Revenue 5.4 8.3 3.1 5.2 7.4 2.5
Indirect taxes 4.4 5.7 0.8 4.2 5.0 0.7
Direct taxes 0.2 1.3 0.7 0.2 1.2 0.4
   Income tax 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.0
   Profits tax 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.2
   Property tax 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2
Non-tax revenue 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9
Other 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.4
Expenditure 6.2 8.7 3.2 5.3 7.5 2.6
Current expense 5.8 8.2 2.7 5.3 7.3 2.2
   Wages and compensation 1.0 4.5 0.7 0.9 4.5 0.7
   Use of goods and services 0.3 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.5
   Grants 4.3 2.7 1.3 3.6 1.5 0.5
   Interest payments and other  
   compensation 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
   Other expenses 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4
Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.4
Gross operating balance -0.4 0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.3
Net lending/borrowing -0.8 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Source: MAU Database, ITA Governing Board. 
table a3 
Sub-national governments in RS as % of GDP
2008 2011
Budget RS Municipalities Budget RS Municipalities
Revenue 6.3 2.6 6.3 2.1
Indirect taxes 4.2 1.3 4.2 1.2
Direct taxes 1.3 0.3 1.3 0.3
   Profits tax 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0
   Income tax 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.2
   Property tax 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Non-tax revenue 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6
Other 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Expenditure 6.2 2.9 5.5 2.2
Current expense 5.9 1.9 5.0 1.7
   Wages and compensation 2.4 0.6 2.7 0.7
   Use of goods and services 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.5
   Grants 2.7 0.6 1.5 0.2
   Interest payments and other  
   compensation 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1
   Other expense 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3
Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets 0.2 1.1 0.5 0.5
Gross operating balance 0.4 0.7 1.3 0.4
Net lending/borrowing 0.1 -0.3 0.8 -0.1
Source: MAU Database, ITA Governing Board. 
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